DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR:	J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM:	M. P. Duncan and M. T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives
SUBJECT:	SRS Report for Week Ending January 4, 2008

Interim Salt Disposition Project: All Management Self-Assessment pre-start corrective actions have been closed and all Plan of Action prerequisites have been met. The contractor declared they were ready to proceed with their Operational Readiness Review.

Facility Evaluation Board (FEB): A recent Facility Evaluation Board review noted a declining trend nearly across the board at the tritium facilities although the overall grade was still average. Findings addressed deficiencies with Limiting Condition for Operation understanding and tracking, control room alarm response and command and control, shift routines, operator rounds, and procedure compliance.

The FEB has recently identified issues with the Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) Program for procuring safety-related parts and the Nonconformance Report (NCR) Program during their reviews at HB-Line and Defense Programs. For example, several Receiving Inspection Criteria Packages for safety-significant work packages failed to identify any Critical Characteristics for Acceptance to validate the part's safety function or failure mode. In other cases, Post Maintenance Tests (PMT) were relied on for validating the part's safety function and failure mode without sufficient evaluation that the PMT would actually validate this. Furthermore, several safety-significant parts were accepted for installation and use based on inadequate dedication. Independent reviews also noted areas for improvement with the thoroughness and engineering rigor of the NCR program, especially with Requests for Conditional Release. The contractor president has requested that all 125 open NCRs across SRS be reviewed to ensure the engineering evaluations are sufficiently rigorous and program requirements are met. Corrective actions are also to be developed for the CGD program.

H-Canyon: In light of recent crane events (see 11/02/07 and 12/21/07 weekly reports), H-Canyon management will be conducting focused observations of H-Canyon crane operations to identify weaknesses in procedure compliance, training, and good operating practices.

Spent Nuclear Fuel: All fuel was removed from the spent fuel cask that encountered grappling problems. The cause of the grappling difficulties is under investigation. (See 12/21/07 weekly report).